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BOOK REVIEW
EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA. By Jack Harri-
son Pollack. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979. Pp.
viii, 386. $14.95.
Reviewed by Richard Y. Funston*
"Now he belongs to the ages," Secretary of State William
Seward reputedly said at the moment of Abraham Lincoln's pass-
ing. Were the scene to be repeated today, the Secretary would be
forced to amend his pronouncement. "Now," the modern Seward
would have to say, "he belongs to the journalists."
Earl Warren was a decent, personable, and humane man who
had the good fortune to preside over the Supreme Court of the
United States at a peculiarly propitious moment. That, surely, is
enough to say for any man's lifetime, and someday the definitive
biography of Warren will say it. In the meantime, it remains some-
thing of a mystery why aging liberals find it necessary to canonize
the late Chief Justice. Nevertheless, journalist Jack Harrison Pol-
lack's Earl Warren: The Judge Who Changed America is the lat-
est addition to the Warren hagiography.1 In it you meet Warren,
the self-effacing, underpaid, young District Attorney; Warren, the
legal scholar; Warren, the Supreme Court's "most influential mem-
ber";2 Warren, the ever-wise, ever-virtuous Chairman of the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Ken-
nedy; and Warren, the internationalist, who so opened the door to
rapprochement with the People's Republic of China that the
Nixon Administration's efforts were merely a formality.
In fairness, it must be said that Mr. Pollack tries to present a
balanced picture, but his heart just is not in it. Thus, Pollack ad-
mits that some of Warren's actions before his appointment to the
bench were less than noble, and that some of Warren's opinions for
the Court were less than notable. At the same time, however, he
adjures us to "restrain the temptation to over-moralize about some
* Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. A.B., 1965, M.A., 1967,
Ph.D., 1970, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA (1979).
2. Id. at 200.
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of Warren's less noble actions."3 Pollack himself should have exer-
cised such restraint when commenting on Warren's more noble ac-
tions. Unfortunately, he did not, and the biography makes its
points by hyperbole, innuendo, and inaccuracy.
Indeed, the flavor of the book may be captured in one unfor-
gettable sentence: "Everything that Warren wrote was obviously
important; all his observations were balanced and fair; all his con-
clusions were unexceptionable."' That some of America's most
brilliant legal scholars did in fact take strong exception to War-
ren's writings5 is not noted.
Perhaps as a result of The Brethren,' I, like many students of
the Court, may have become hypersensitive to undocumented
"revelations" about the Court. Nevertheless, apart from a post-
scriptive claim to have interviewed various people and a meager
and simplistic bibliography, Pollack wholly fails to substantiate
any of his statements, even when attribution (as in the case of a
public speech) would be neither difficult nor violative of a confi-
dence. Thus, Pollack freely asserts that Chief Justice Vinson left
his opinion writing to his law clerks,' that anti-Semitism was the
cause of Justice Fortas' difficulties with the Senate,8 and that he
knows how Chief Justice Warren voted in three different presiden-
tial elections.9 It is ironic, then, that Pollack severely criticizes
President Eisenhower for his inability to document specifically the
decisions that led to his disenchantment with Warren. "[I]n fact,"
Pollack writes, "he [Eisenhower] did not really know what deci-
sions he was talking about."'10
Quite frankly neither does Pollack know what decisions he is
talking about. Watkins v. United States"' and Sweezy v. New
Hampshire"2 are hailed as "serving notice ... that henceforth the
3. Id. at 95.
4. Id. at 310.
5. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); A. BICKEL, THE Su-
PREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
(1975); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); Kurland,
Earl Warren, The "Warren Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REv. 353 (1968).
6. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). A useful palliative to Wood-
ward and Armstrong is to be found in Adler, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, pt.
VII, at 1.
7. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 150.
8. Id. at 281.
9. Id. at 204, 287.
10. Id. at 262.
11. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
12. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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Court would be fearless in defending individual rights during...
investigative procedures by all branches of government .... De-
spite pressure from the Eisenhower Administration and other
quarters, the Warren Court never backtracked in its refusal to per-
mit 'national security' . . . to be used as a pretext for infringing
upon individual rights." 13 Barenblatt v. United States1 4 is never
mentioned. Wesberry v. Sanders5 (misspelled by Pollack as
Westberry) is credited 6 with extending the rule of Reynolds v.
Sims, 17 even though Wesberry was decided before Reynolds. The
holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"' is stated with almost
ludicrous inaccuracy;' but then, Pollack thinks that Sullivan was
decided in 1954.20
To continue to document Pollack's numerous errors regarding
Warren Court decisionmaking, however, would incorrectly convey
the impression that the book is primarily concerned with judicial
interpretation during Warren's tenure. Actually, Pollack's subtitle
is something of a misnomer. By a most generous count, only
eighty-one of the volume's three hundred and eighty-six pages are
devoted to judicial decisions. Much more attention is given to
Warren's political career before he came to the bench. In fact, the
book's chapters rather curiously correspond to presidential terms.
One gets the impression that, for Pollack, the greatest thing about
Warren is that he almost ran for President; and Pollack leaves no
doubt as to the kind of President that Warren would have been:
He would have been a wise Mr. Honest, and not in the sanctimonious manner
of Jimmy Carter. He had a broader, less partisan vision than Ford; he was
more principled than Nixon; less devious and arrogant than Johnson; more
experienced and mature than Kennedy; more of an activist than Eisenhower;
less impulsive than Truman.21
Reading about Warren's rise from Assistant District Attorney
to Vice Presidential nominee, one could come to a quite different
conclusion. Warren was a vigorous prosecutor of communism and
victimless crimes, who enthusiastically enforced the California
anti-syndicalism statute and conducted a personal vendetta
13. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 188-89 (emphasis in original).
14. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
15. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 261.
17. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 261.
20. Id. at 346.
21. Id. at 11.
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against certain gambling elements. With a good deal of political
acumen and some cynicism, he refashioned the office of California
Attorney General by constitutional amendment, doubling its sal-
ary, to suit himself before seeking the office. Warren was a member
of the white supremacist Native Sons of the Golden West and an
early advocate of Japanese-American internment during World
War II. He sought and accepted the backing of the conservative
publisher of the Oakland Tribune, Joseph Knowland, and then liq-
uidated the debt by appointing Knowland's son, William, to the
United States Senate. He often flowed with the tide, opportunisti-
cally changing position on issues as grave as war and peace and
dutifully mouthing whatever happened to be the Republican Party
line at any given time. Warren was, in short, a good electoral poli-
tician who tried to do his best under the circumstances as he saw
them and, on more than one occasion, made a mistake.
When Pollack faces up to, rather than rationalizes, this behav-
ior, his portrait of Warren is much more creditable.2 Unfortu-
nately, he does not face the facts very often. Rather, the reader is
asked to believe, for example, that a man who at age thirty-four
was one of the youngest District Attorneys in the United States
succeeded entirely on good luck and ability.23 Supposedly there
was no driving ambition, no will to succeed. Warren was just one of
the boys.
Pollack endeavors to excuse Warren's past with two alterna-
tive theories. First, Pollack argues that Warren never really meant
the "terrible" things he said back in the 1930s and 1940s. That
does not do his case much good, though, since Warren then
emerges as an intellectual mediocrity who just did what the party
told him to do. Consequently, Pollack's second line of attack is to
argue that Warren was later sorry for what he had said and done.
This latter contention makes one wonder, however, whether War-
ren's interpretation of the Constitution proceeded from a subcon-
scious desire to right the wrongs he had done in his earlier career.24
Pollack, though, does not pursue the idea; he is interested in
apotheosis, not analysis.
22. E.g., id. at 79.
23. Id. at 44-45.
24. In fact, Pollack suggests as much. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 56. Note also the
observation that, under a Warren-initiated educational exchange program "several thousand
young farmers from Japan have enjoyed a year's agricultural training in California thanks,
perhaps, in large measure to the penitent conscience of the man who had sparked Japanese
internment a decade earlier." Id. at 129.
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As a result, Pollack's discussion of the Warren Commission is
indeed strange. While Pollack is determined to find-or, at least,
hint darkly at-a conspiracy in the assassination of President Ken-
nedy, he is equally determined to absolve Warren of any responsi-
bility for the commission's failure to discover that conspiracy. Yet,
at the same time, he wants to prove that "Warren [was] the com-
mission."25 The two positions are self-contradictory. Either there
was a conspiracy and the commissioners, including Warren,
through malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance, failed to find it;
or there was no conspiracy, and the commission's report, although
flawed, is essentially correct. In either case, it strains credulity to
believe that Warren (or anyone else) could have consistently dic-
tated to men like John J. McCloy, Allen Dulles, and Richard Rus-
sell. As in his discussion of the Warren Court, Pollack exaggerates
the centrality of Warren's role on the Commission.
Despite Pollack's assertions, Earl Warren was not the intellec-
tual leader of the Court. If the Warren Court had such a leader, it
was Hugo Black.' 6 Pollack, however, sees Black, as an "all-out lib-
eral"2 7 who became "increasingly erratic. 2 8 Pollack clearly does
not understand Justice Black, but then neither did Warren. For
better or worse, Black's theory of judging was "comprehensive and
internally consistent. '2' That theory, of course, was intended to
constrain judicial activism. 30 In the hands of judges like Warren,
however, uncommitted to Black's constitutional literalism and
lacking his fidelity to history, it actually became an apology for
judicial intervention on a broad scale.
In his later years, Black's principal intellectual adversary (and
best friend) was Justice Harlan. 1 It was Harlan who developed the
concept of federalism, a concept Warren had difficulty compre-
hending,32 into a powerful critique of Warren Court decisionmak-
25. Id. at 233.
26. See G. DUNNE, HUGo BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); G. WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION (1976); Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitu-
tion, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673 (1963); Snowiss, The Legacy of Justice Black, 1973 Sup. CT. REV.
187; Yarbrough, Justices Black and Douglas: The Judicial Function and the Scope of Con-
stitutional Liberties, 1973 DUKE L.J. 441.
27. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 167.
28. Id. at 300.
29. G. WHITE, supra note 26, at 332.
30. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
31. See generally D. SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY (1969); Wil-
kinson, Justice John M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REv. 1185 (1971).
32. For example, compare Chief Justice Warren's opinions for the Court in Reynolds
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ing. It was Harlan who carried on the tradition of Justice Holmes,
and it was Harlan who demonstrated that judicial activism in the
name of equality was not a necessary good. Yet Pollack mentions
Harlan only a handful of times, almost invariably preceded by the
adjective "conservative." The substance of Harlan's critique is
never presented.33 It is simply dismissed as "petulant."3
Nevertheless, Harlan fares better than Justice Frankfurter,
the Warren Court's most thoroughgoing spokesman for judicial re-
straint.3 5 None of the other Justices "envisaged so limited a role
for the Court as [did] Frankfurter, none maintained a jurispruden-
tial stance in which procedural technicalities played such a domi-
nant part, and none defined his position as a judge in so self-abne-
gated a fashion."3  More than any other modern Justice,
Frankfurter emphasized the element of choice in judicial interpre-
tation and, on the bases of both democratic philosophy and insti-
tutional prudence, argued for a restrained exercise of that choice.
As with Harlan, however, Pollack summarily derides this approach
to the judicial function. It was, he writes, merely Frankfurter's
"pet theme. '37
Perhaps the most consistent theme in Pollack's book is War-
ren's animosity towards and long-running feud with Richard
Nixon. Not surprisingly, Pollack builds up Warren at Nixon's ex-
pense. For Pollack, when Warren re-examined and changed his po-
sition on a particular issue, often quite suddenly, he exhibited
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinions in the same cases.
33. In fact, Pollack credits Warren with influencing Harlan's opinion in Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). See J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 189. The more likely
influence was Judge Learned Hand. The intellectual origins of Yates' distinction between
the advocacy of unlawful action as opposed to abstract doctrine can be traced directly to
Hand's opinion in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). Hand, however,
was a vigorous Warren critic, and Pollack mentions him only once, in a disparaging para-
graph which lumps Judge Hand together with George Wallace and millionaire Texas cattle-
men. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at vii.
34. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 362.
35. See generally P. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1971); W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER (1961); W. MENDELSON, FELIX
FRANKFURTER (1964); Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 430 (1973). But see Grant, Felix Frankfurter: A Dissenting Opinion, 12 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1013 (1965).
36. G. WHITE, supra note 26, at 359.
37. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 197.
38. Pollack, however, must necessarily treat Nixon with some ambivalence. After all, it
was Nixon who, although for his own political purposes, was in large measure responsible for
Warren's appointment to the Court. Id. at 6. Moreover, Pollack's liberal sympathies are
congruent with Nixon's position as counsel in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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statesmanlike flexibility;3 9 when Nixon did the same, he was
merely opportunistic. When Nixon in his memoirs quoted an (al-
leged) early Warren pronouncement, Pollack severely criticizes him
for not documenting the statement.40 Although Nixon succeeded in
improving relations with the People's Republic of China, Pollack
insists it was nothing more than the culmination of the efforts of
others, including, of course, Warren.41
The nadir of this effort to discredit Nixon is reached in Pol-
lack's discussion of the Kennedy assassination. A paragraph is in-
serted, at the expense of the narrative, informing the reader that
two days before the assassination Nixon went to Dallas to attend a
meeting of the board of directors of one of his law firm's clients,
Pepsi Cola. While such is surely a legitimate reason, Pollack
breathlessly informs us that this was the only time Nixon was in
Dallas during 1963!42 When Senator Joe McCarthy engaged in this
kind of character assassination by inference, Pollack presumably
(and rightly) condemned it. It should equally be condemned now.
Whatever Nixon's involvement in Kennedy's death, however,
Pollack leaves no doubt that Nixon was at least indirectly respon-
sible for Warren's.43 Pollack claims that the inner turmoil that
Watergate caused Warren hastened his death. Watergate, of
course, was attributable to the Nixon Administration, and not to
modern America's institutions. Such a view is clearly shortsighted,
for "[tihe sources of Watergate are [to be] found not in the para-
noia of the King of San Clemente but in modern Americans' faith
in the capacity of concentrated power to do good-quite in con-
trast with the Founders' knowledge of power's tendency to do evil
.... The problem identified by Watergate lay not with the Presi-
dent but with the presidency,"'44 a presidency bloated with a power
that the Warren Court countenanced and encouraged. 45
Given Pollack's rabidly anti-Nixon orientation, his treatment
of the present Supreme Court is predictable. Whereas the Warren
Court realized a constitutional revolution, the Burger Court is per-
petrating a counterrevolution,'4 eroding the Warren Court's com-
39. E.g., J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 161-62.
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id. at 304.
42. Id. at 248.
43. Id. at 318.
44. Funston, Book Review, 84 AM. HIST. REv. 283 (1979) (reviewing P. KURLAND,
WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978)).
45. See R. FUNSTON, A VITAL NATIONAL SEMINAR, ch. 3 (1978).
46. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 363. There is a considerable body of scholarship that
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mitment to desegregation, 7 threatening freedom of the press,48
and perhaps reintroducing prayer in the public schools.49 More-
over, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun vote together so
often that "it would be cheaper to give Chief Justice Burger two
votes and have only eight Justices." 50 Not unexpectedly, nowhere
does Pollack mention that it was the Burger Court that approved
busing as a desegregation remedy,51 applied the mandate of Brown
v. Board of Education52 to northern school districts,5 and sus-
tained affirmative action programs;54 that the Burger Court has
been adamant in its refusal to countenance public aid to parochial
primary and secondary schools; 55 that the Burger Court has
granted the press virtual license to comment upon pending crimi-
nal trials56 or that many of the press claims it has denied lacked
either historical or legal foundation;" that the Burger Court has
gone much further than the Warren Court toward recognizing a
consitutional principle of sexual equality,58 protecting private
choice in matters of procreation, 59 and limiting the use of capital
punishment;60 or that, during Warren's last six terms on the Court,
he and Justice Brennan voted together more consistently than
challenges this idea. See, e.g., R. FUNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? (1977); S.
WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1976); Kalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War,
85 HARv. L. REV. 3 (1971); Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972
Sup. CT. REv. 181; Mason, The Burger Court in Historical Perspective, 89 POL. Sci. Q. 27
(1974). Even those scholars who do adhere to the idea admit it must be seriously qualified in
several respects. See, e.g., Dorsen, The Court of Some Resort, 1 Civ. LiB. REV. 82 (Winter-
Spring 1974); Symposium-The Burger Court: New Directions in Judicial Policy-Making,
23 EMORY L.J. 643 (1974).
47. J. POLLACK, supra note 1. at 180, 340-41.
48. Id. at 346.
49. Id. at 342.
50. Id. at 300.
51. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
54. United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
55. E.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
56. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
57. See Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 225.
58. E.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Getman, The Emerging Constitutional
Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 SuP. CT. REv. 157.
59. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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have Burger and Blackmun."1
On the other hand, it may be just as well that Pollack neglects
to discuss these matters, because when he does discuss the specif-
ics of Burger Court decisionmaking, he has trouble getting them
right. For example, Pollack writes that, as a result of Burger Court
decisions, "[tioday, police are permitted to make warrantless ar-
rests; to stop and frisk motorists at will .... ,,e2 As for the first
charge, Pollack would apparently be surprised to learn that the
Burger Court did not invent the warrantless arrest. The right of an
officer, under certain circumstances, to make an arrest without a
warrant is virtually as old as professional police forces." As for the
second charge, United States v. Robinson" and Gustafson v. Flor-
ida" did expand the scope of a search that may be conducted inci-
dent to a lawful arrest for a traffic violation." Those decisions,
however, do require a lawful arrest-i.e., probable
cause-something the Warren Court itself did not require in Terry
v. Ohio. 7 As a matter of fact, the Burger Court has unanimously
taken a skeptical approach to the power of law enforcement to ini-
tiate an investigatory stop.68
The best of Pollack's passages, however, is the following:
The "Nixon Four" voted as a bloc in fifty-four out of sixty-six cases heard by
the Court during the 1972 spring term. Actually, no Warren Court decisions
were overturned, but many were redefined in ways that limited their scope
(former interpretations were now sometimes referred to as "harmless error").
Police powers, especially with respect to search and seizure, were broadened:
Harris vs New York, for example, gave law enforcers the right to use a previ-
ous arrest for any [sic] crime as a warrant to search for evidence that an
arrested person might have committed another, different, crime."
Several observations are warranted. First of all, neither I nor any
61. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 3, 345 (1971).
62. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 342.
63. See H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JusTIcE SYSTEM 248-49 (1972).
64. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
65. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
66. The point is not that the results reached in Robinson and Gustafson are desirable.
That is certainly a debatable question. Compare LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" ver-
sus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, with
White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson
and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165. Before one can honestly and intelligently debate the
desirability of a Supreme Court holding, however, it is necessary to know what the Court
did hold and to state it accurately.
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
68. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975).
69. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 307.
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other student of the Court knows what the "Spring term" is. I as-
sume that Pollack means the October Term, 1971. Regardless,
Harris v. New York7" was not decided in that term but in the pre-
vious one. Of course, Pollack may have some other cases in mind,
since Harris does not hold anything like what Pollack says it does.
Rather, Harris involved the admissibility of unlawfully obtained
statements for purposes of impeaching a defendant's testimony at
trial. Perhaps Pollack meant United States v. Harris.71 That, after
all, was a fourth amendment case. That case, however, dealt with
the issue of an informer's reliability as the basis for a probable
cause affidavit and not with the use of a previous arrest. In any
event, it too was not decided in the spring of 1972. As for Pollack's
mangling of the harmless error rule, more than the few, brief pages
of this review would be required to straighten that out. 2 Neverthe-
less, the passage is something of a minor achievement, for it clearly
manifests the disregard for detail that permeates the book.
In its insistence on oversimplification to the point of error,
this biography is, in a kind of odd way, worthy of its subject. A
typical Warren opinion begins with an impassioned statement that,
taken in the context of the case, is usually pure dictum.73 Some-
times it will introduce a quantum jump in American jurisprudence
as nothing more than "an explication of basic rights that are en-
shrined in our Constitution." 74 Often it will reduce complexity to
caricature, 5 so that difficult questions involving competing consti-
tutional principles are presented as simple struggles between gov-
ernment and the individual.
Warren's confidence in his own rectitude had its consequences
for his approach to the judicial function. As Holmes once wrote, "If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a cer-
tain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
70. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
71. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
72. For a good introduction to the subject, see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error,
20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967).
73. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). Pollack writes that Miranda's "con-
stitutional bases are sound." J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 270. It may have initiated a desir-
able policy, but it is difficult to see the solidity of the legal foundations of a decision that
claims to be based upon the fifth amendment yet cannot cite a single fifth amendment pre-
cedent to support itself.
75. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599 (1961).
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law and sweep away all opposition. '76 Warren never doubted his
premises, and he enjoyed power."Was his mind more executive
that judicial?" Pollack asks.77 The question must certainly be rhe-
torical. Warren was a man born to govern, not to judge; but if nec-
essary, he would govern from the bench. Unlike, for example,
Frankfurter, he was unable to separate his substantive evaluation
of a given policy from his analysis of the question whether the en-
actment of that policy was within the constitutional powers of gov-
ernment. As Governor, he had exhibited impatience with the legis-
lative process and its slow, compromising reconciliation of
competing interests. As Chief Justice, he regarded it with con-
tempt, gratuitously lecturing legislators on their duties-as he saw
them. 8 Consistently underlying Warren's performance on the
Court is an ultimate faith in judicial paternalism. In Brown, in
Marchetti v. United States,7 9 in Roth v. United States,s or in Mi-
randa v. Arizona,8 1 Warren's commitment was to use judicial
power to suppress behavior that he personally found obnoxious.
One of the fundamental questions in the history of the Ameri-
can republic has been the extent to which well-meaning judges
should use their office to foster their own political, economic, or
moral philosophies. An imperial Court, after all, is no more com-
patible with the principles of limited government than an imperial
presidency. Both smack of an enlightened despotism that is no less
despotic for being enlightened. Pollack, however, is unconcerned
with the problem. He merely quotes from Warren's last public ad-
dress, a commencement speech at Morehouse College: "The great
virtue of our government is that people can do something about it.
They elect our representatives on all levels of government, our
mayors, our legislators, our governors, and our President. When
76. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Pollack
attempts to associate Warren with Holmes. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 263-64. Such an
effort can only proceed from ignorance of Holmes' jurisprudence. See G. WHITE, supra note
26, at ch. 8.
77. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 4.
78. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957). Political scientists have not generally been complimentary in their comments about
the Warren Court's handling of the legislative investigation cases, largely because it pro-
ceeded from an unrealistic conception of the legislative functior, See, e.g., R. FUNSTON,
supra note 29, at 102-08; M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT, ch. 2
(1964).
79. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
80. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
81. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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they have made a mistake, they can rectify it. ' ' 2 But what about
our federal judges? The electoral principle will not legitimate their
efforts in social experimentation. They are unelected, life-tenured,
unrepresentative in any immediate sense, and in a strict sense,
irresponsible.
Moreover, judicial paternalism, whether to promote laissez-
faire or equality, raises questions not only of legitimacy but, more
practically, of institutional capacity.83 Judges, even Supreme Court
Justices, are inadequately trained in many areas of public policy.
Their policymaking is piecemeal. Because courts are essentially
passive bodies, they must wait for the cases to come to them, and
the cases have a perverse way of not arising in logical order. The
adversary system is not well-suited to providing judges with the
kind of empirical data a good policymaker should have, and adju-
dication makes no provision for systematic policy review once a
particular course of action is adopted.
None of this, however, is recognized in Pollack's book. Accord-
ing to Pollack, "the legacy of Earl Warren" is "Controversy, Con-
trast, Courage, Compassion and Conquest. 8 4 Conquest? Surely,
that is an odd word to use with respect to a judicial legacy. Per-
haps Pollack has in mind the "conquest" of history. Like many
people, he believes that history ultimately will vindicate the War-
ren legacy,85 but some contemporary developments cast doubt
upon the staying power of the Warren legacy.8 Recent data raise
questions about the continued validity of the empirical bases of
Brown.17 The decline of support for public education proceeds
from a strong, albeit inarticulate, opposition to the school's adop-
tion of a social-corrective role at the expense of teaching-a role
encouraged by Warren Court decisions. The taxpayers' revolt, how-
ever ill-considered, is an expression of dissatisfaction with pater-
nalistic government, including judicial paternalism in the name of
equality. Indeed, belying his confidence that history will vindicate
Warren, Pollack expresses some skepticism about those very ma-
jorities that Warren hailed.88
82. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 321.
83. See D. HOROwITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
84. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 337.
85. Id. at 338, 368. See, e.g., Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46
WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970).
86. See R. FUNSTON, supra note 46, at 319-25.
87. See, e.g., C. JENKS, INEQUALrrY (1972); Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB.
INTEREST 90 (1972).
88. J. POLLACK, supra note 1, at 344.
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Was Earl Warren "the judge who changed America?" Cer-
tainly, that claims too much for Warren. The Chief Justice is but
the first among equals, and Warren, while perhaps a strong force
for unity, was less than the Court's dominant intellect. No one,
though, can gainsay that the Warren Court changed America.
Whether those changes were wise or desirable are questions about
which reasonable minds will differ. Pollack thinks that they were.
Whether those changes will last, as Pollack also thinks, is more
problematic. Whether the judicial process is an appropriate mecha-
nism for the realization of social change in a republican form of
government is a question that Pollack does not answer. He never
asks it.

